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The New York City High School Match
By ATI ˙LA ABDULKADI ˙ROG ˘LU,P ARAG A. PATHAK, AND ALVIN E. ROTH*
We assisted the New York City Department
of Education (NYCDOE) in designing a mech-
anism to match over 90,000 entering students to
public high schools each year. This paper makes
a very preliminary report on the design process
and the ﬁrst year of operation, in academic year
2003–2004, for students entering high school in
fall 2004. In the ﬁrst year, only about 3,000
students had to be assigned to a school for
which they had not indicated a preference,
which is only 10 percent of the number of such
assignments the previous year.
New York City has the largest public school
system in the country, with over a million stu-
dents. In 1969 the system was decentralized into
over 30 community school districts. In the
1990s, the city began to take more centralized
control (Mark Schneider et al., 2000), and in
2002, a newly reorganized NYCDOE began to
reform many aspects of the school system.
In May 2003, Jeremy Lack, then the NYCDOE
Director of Strategic Planning, contacted one of
us for advice on designing a new high-school
matching process. The NYCDOE was aware of
the matching process for American physicians,
the National Resident Matching Program (Roth,
1984; Roth and E. Peranson, 1999). They
wanted to know if it could be appropriately
adapted to the city’s schools. The three authors
of the present paper (and, at several crucial
junctures, also Tayfun So ¨nmez) advised (and
often convinced) Lack, his colleagues (particu-
larly Elizabeth Sciabarra and Neil Dorosin), and
the DOE’s software vendor, about the design of
the match.
I. The Prior (2002–2003) New York City
Matching Procedure
There are seven specialized high schools in
New York City whose places are allocated by
entrance exam (one by auditions). Rising high-
school students (mostly 8th-graders, but some
9th-graders) could also apply to up to ﬁve other
programs, by ranking them on a preference list.
(Different high-school programs, with separate
applications and admissions, are referred to
here, interchangeably, as schools or programs.
There are over 500 programs.) Just over 50
percent of students in 2002 applied to the max-
imum allowable ﬁve programs. Schools receiv-
ing a student’s application saw her list of
preferences (and could see where they ranked
on the list). How they processed applications
varied by program type.
Unscreened programs admit students by lot-
tery. Zoned schools give priority to students
from the local neighborhoods, and many posi-
tions were ﬁlled this way. (One impetus for
increasing school choice was to make sure stu-
dents who lived in disadvantaged neighbor-
hoods were not automatically assigned to
disadvantaged schools.)
Screened programs can evaluate students in-
dividually. Educational Option (EdOpt) pro-
grams also can evaluate students individually
for half their seats, subject to the restriction that
16 percent be allocated to students who were
rated top performers in a standardized English
Language Arts exam, 68 percent to middle per-
formers, and 16 percent to lower performers.
The other half of the seats are allocated by
lottery, according to the same distribution of
test scores. EdOpt programs were also subject
to a special rule: any student with an ELA score
in the top 2 percent would be automatically
admitted if the program was ranked ﬁrst on the
student’s list. (Screened and EdOpt schools
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364could use whether a student ranked them ﬁrst as
an admissions criterion for any student.)
Subject to these constraints, schools could
decide which of their applicants to accept, place
on a waiting list, or reject. Each applicant re-
ceived a letter with the decisions of the schools
to which she had applied, and applicants were
required to accept no more than one offer, and
one wait-list. This process was repeated: after
the responses to the ﬁrst letter were received,
schools with vacant positions could make new
offers, and after replies were received, a third
letter with new offers was sent. New offers did
not necessarily go to wait-listed students in a
ﬁxed order. Students not assigned after the third
step were assigned to their zoned schools, or
assigned via an administrative process. There
was an appeals process, and an “over the
counter” process for assigning students who had
changed addresses or were otherwise unas-
signed before school began.
Three rounds of processing applications to no
more than ﬁve out of more than 500 programs
by almost 100,000 students was insufﬁcient to
allocate all the students. That is, this process
suffered from congestion (Roth and Xiaolin
Xing, 1997): not enough offers and acceptances
could be made to clear the market. Only about
50,000 students received offers initially, about
17,000 of whom received multiple offers. When
the process concluded, approximately 30,000
students had been assigned to a school that was
nowhere on their choice list.
Three features of this process particularly
motivated NYCDOE’s desire for a new match-
ing system. First were the approximately 30,000
students not assigned to a school they had cho-
sen. Second, students and their families had to
be strategic in their choices. Students who had a
substantial chance of being rejected by their true
ﬁrst-choice school had to think about the risk of
listing it ﬁrst, since, if one of their lower-choice
schools took students’ rankings into account,
they might have done better to list it ﬁrst. (The
2002–2003 Directory of the New York City
Public High Schools advises students (p. x) that,
when ranking schools, they should “... deter-
mine what your competition is for a seat in this
program.” A similar problem occurs in Boston
schools (see Abdulkadirog ˘lu and So ¨nmez,
2003; Abdulkadirog ˘lu et al., 2005). Third,
schools were also strategic: a substantial num-
ber of schools apparently managed to conceal
capacity from the central administration, thus
preserving places that could be ﬁlled later.
II. Design of the New System
Initial discussions focused on whether the
medical match was a good model for New York
City schools, or whether another kind of clear-
inghouse might be more appropriate. The med-
ical match applied to schools would be a two-
sided model in which both schools and students
have preferences, with the object of implement-
ing a stable assignment, that is, an efﬁcient
assignment such that no school and student not
matched to one another would both prefer to be.
Thus, the question was, are the students the only
real players in the system, with choices by
schools merely a device for allocating scarce
spaces? If this were the case, there might be
appropriate one-sided clearinghouse models in
which only student preferences determine efﬁ-
cient allocations (cf. Boston Public Schools;
Abdulkadirog ˘lu et al., 2005).
Two things convinced us that New York City
schools are a two-sided market. The ﬁrst was
that schools withheld capacity to match with
students they preferred. Stable assignments
would eliminate the main incentives for this.
Second, discussions indicated that principals of
different EdOpt schools had different prefer-
ences even for students with reading scores in
the lowest category, with some schools prefer-
ring higher scores and others preferring students
who had good attendance. If schools have dif-
ferent comparative advantages, allowing scope
for their preferences seemed sensible. Also, the
fact that school administrators gamed the sys-
tem indicated they were strategic players.
The medical match employs an applicant-
proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm (David
Gale and Lloyd Shapley, 1962; Roth and
Peranson, 1999). Ignoring for the moment the
details of New York City schools, this could be
applied as follows. Students and schools rank
each other (schools do not see students’ prefer-
ences), and the clearinghouse processes these
lists so:
(i) Each student applies to her highest ranked
school, and each school rejects unranked
applicants and “holds” its highest ranked
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it has) and rejects the rest.
(ii) At any stage at which a student has been
rejected, she applies to her next most pre-
ferred school if one remains. Each school
holds its most preferred set of applications
and rejects the rest.
(iii) The algorithm stops when no rejections are
issued, and each school is matched to the
applicants it is holding.
No student would receive multiple offers. We
discussed whether this was an unmixed beneﬁt:
students who received multiple offers in the old
system might beneﬁt from this (e.g., in in-
creased decision time). But relatively few such
students chose a school different from their
indicated preferred choice, so this seemed like a
bearable cost, considering that in a system with-
out excess capacity the cost of giving some
students multiple offers is that multiple students
get no offers.
The next design choice was whether the al-
gorithm should be student-proposing, or another
stable mechanism (e.g., schools-proposing). A
student-proposing algorithm was selected be-
cause this has the best welfare properties for
students and (in sufﬁciently simple environ-
ments) makes it a dominant strategy for students
to state true preferences (and since no alterna-
tive stable mechanism gives schools straightfor-
ward incentives [Roth and M. Sotomayor, 1990;
So ¨nmez, 1997]).
Of course, adapting the mechanism to the
regulations and customs of New York City
schools involved departures from the simple
algorithm (cf. Roth, 2002). Schools that allo-
cated seats by lottery are assigned randomly
generated preferences. Each (half) EdOpt pro-
gram is treated as three different programs
whose preferences must reﬂect the 16/68/16
reading score distribution. If a student ranked an
EdOpt school, this was treated in the algorithm
as a preference for one of the random slots ﬁrst,
followed by a preference for one of the slots
determined by the school’s preferences.
The EdOpt automatic admit for top-2-percent
students who choose it ﬁrst could not be
changed, although this adds strategic risk to the
decisions of students who are eligible to use it.
Another decision that makes some students not
have a dominant strategy is that preference lists
were limited to a maximum of 12 schools. Over
22,000 students listed 12 in the ﬁrst year, so this
was a binding constraint. These choices are
therefore candidates to be revisited when mod-
iﬁcations are considered.
NYCDOE wanted students who are offered
specialized-school positions also to be given an
offer from a nonspecialized school. Therefore
students who applied to specialized schools
submit a preference list of nonspecialized
schools along with all other students, and a ﬁrst
round of the algorithm is run with all students.
Students who receive a specialized-school offer
receive a letter giving them a choice between that
exam school and a nonspecialized school. After
they respond, capacities are adjusted, students
who accepted offers are removed, and the algo-
rithm is run again. Only after this second round
are students who did not receive specialized-
school offers told their assignment.
We would have preferred to integrate these
two rounds into one, by having applicants in-
clude the specialized schools in their preference
lists. (The two-round design creates a possibil-
ity of unstable allocations, as when a student
gets an offer from a specialized school, but not
from a nonspecialized school he prefers that
would have had a place for him after the
specialized-school students have declined places.)
However, if students who are offered specialized-
school places generally rank high in all schools’
preferences, this may not be a big problem.
Students who were unassigned after the sec-
ond round were informed of the schools with
empty places and asked for another preference
list of up to 12 schools. The NYCDOE felt there
would be insufﬁcient time to elicit new prefer-
ences from schools (a decision that might use-
fully be reviewed in the future), and so these
students were ordered in a single random list
that was used as the preferences for all schools
in a third round of the algorithm. (This com-
pares favorably with alternative methods of
randomization.) The small number of stu-
dents who remained unmatched were assigned
administratively.
III. First Year of Operation
The new match matched over 70,000 students
to a school on their initial choice list, an in-
crease of more than 20,000 students compared
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previous year. An additional 7,600 students
who were unmatched based on their initial pref-
erences were assigned to schools based on the
preferences they submitted over schools that
still had vacancies.
Of over 90,000 students who submitted pref-
erences, approximately 8,000 students with-
drew from the New York City public schools,
and more than 2,000 remained in their current
school either in a 9th-grade program or through
failure to graduate, leaving approximately 3,000
students who did not receive any school they
chose. This compares to the approximately
30,000 who NYCDOE reports were administra-
tively assigned, mostly to zoned schools, the
previous year.
Much of this difference is due to allowing
students to rank 12 instead of ﬁve choices, and
to giving each student a single offer, rather than
multiple offers to some students. Interestingly,
it appears that at least 3,000 more students
received one of their ﬁrst ﬁve stated choices
than in the previous year, under the old system.
Just over 5,100 students appealed their as-
signments, around 2,600 were granted on a
case-by-case basis. (Around 300 appeals were
from students who received their ﬁrst choice.
Some of these may have had to do with bad
information about new programs. But some
may reﬂect the difﬁculty of soliciting prefer-
ences involving 13–14-year-olds.) Designing an
efﬁcient appeals process remains a priority.
Thus despite some signiﬁcant ﬁrst-year prob-
lems of communication and implementation,
the new match seems to have achieved many of
its goals.
IV. Conclusions
New York City needs more good schools.
But for a given stock of school places, more
students can be admitted to schools they want
if the matching process is free of congestion,
so that students’ preferences can be fully
taken into account. The new clearinghouse,
organized around a stable matching mecha-
nism, has helped relieve the congestion of the
previous offer/acceptance/wait-list process
and provides more straightforward incentives
to applicants.
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